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I. Introduction
West European countries (as other countries, industrial-
ized and developing alike) have been facing the challenge to
adjust their structure of production, services and employ-
ment to profound changes of the overall economic environment
during the past fifteen years. Some of these changes were
more foreseeable than others. The less foreseeable changes
included the wage explosion, the oil-price hikes, the ex-
change-rates volatility and the microelectronics revolution.
The better foreseeable changes were related with the en-
largements of the European Community and the shifts in the
international division of labour, in particular the fast
penetration of European markets by those developing coun-
tries which have been pursuing outward-oriented industriali-
zation strategies.
In principle, there are two strategies of adjustment: a
positive (forward-looking) and a negative (defensive) one.
Positive adjustment operates through a change in (relative)
prices and through the incentives and disincentives thereby
created for investors and workers. By contrast, negative
adjustment operates "at constant prices", i.e. by changes in
quantities, and thus is highly correlated with output los-
ses, unemployment and bankruptcies. The notorious deterior-
ation in the economic performance of the West European coun-
tries since the early seventies means that too much negative
adjustment has taken place, not least because governments,
time and again, resorted to protective measures and sub-
sidies in favour of declining activities and thereby delayed
the process of restructuring.
*
We are indebted to Klaus-Dieter Schmidt for his construc-
tive comments on an earlier draft and to Hermann Dick for
computational assistance with the Kiel general equilibrium
model on the West German economy. The usual disclaimer
applies.- 2 -
The purpose of this paper is to discuss major factors
behind failures and successes in structural adjustment. The
analysis includes the experience of four major European
countries: France, Italy, the United Kingdom and West Ger-
many. These countries are known for diverging performances.
Germany has the highest real per capita income, the lowest
inflation, and the strongest currency, while its unemploy-
ment rate, though depressing by her own historical standards
(8 per cent in 1986 as compared to 1 per cent on average
during the sixties), is distinctly below those of the other
three countries. On the other side of the spectrum is Italy,
but this nation is in fact composed of three economies - a
highly developed and rapidly growing one in the north, a
very backward one in the south and a dynamic "economia
somersa" almost everywhere. The United Kingdom has become
the only oil-rich country in the sample, but probably the
one which has been struggling most with micro-economic inef-
ficiencies and the power of interest groups (labour unions
in particular) in the economic-political decision process
for decades. France has become an industrial and technolo-
gical leader in a shorter space of time (starting its eco-
nomic transformation in the late fifties) than any of the
other sample countries, but it also was struck by an un-
paralleled experimentation with socialism during the early
eighties.
Notwithstanding such differences, these countries have
much in common when the problem of structural adjustment is
brought into perspective. They all have seen the public
sector expanding, the work ethic of the labour force deteri-
orating, the scepticism about economic growth and technology
and science increasing, and the reluctance to adapt to
change enduring. And, as opposed to Japan and the United
States, these countries seem to increasingly lack capability
of consensus among social groups. This is also true of the
other Western European countries, perhaps with the exception
of Switzerland.- 3 -
Therefore, it seems appropriate to focus this study on
the four countries mentioned. There will be a certain bias
towards West Germany, which is mainly due to the greater
availability of adequate statistical data and studies on
structural change. This bias may not be that bad after all
given the share and importance of the German industry in the
EC.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section
describes the overall pattern of structural change. Sub-
sequently, the sources of the decline and rise of industries
are explored. This is followed by some tentative estimates
of future output effects in alternative adjustment scena-
rios. Finally, the major policy implications are briefly
discussed.
II. Patterns of Structural Change: France, Italy, the United
Kingdom, West Germany
1. The Overall Picture:
Economic growth in the four countries by and large shows
the same pattern over time: high rates of growth between
1950 and 1960, and continuously declining rates thereafter
(Table 1). Minor exceptions from this picture are France and
the United Kingdom during the fifties and sixties. These
countries relied most on "planification" (France) or on ex-
tensive governmental controls at the micro-level (the Unit-
ed Kingdom) in the years following World War II. Except for
the eighties, the United Kingdom reveals by far the worst
performance. With regard to West Germany, it is worth noting
that economic growth was fastest during the fifties, when
the government happened to rely largely on the market mecha-
nism for steering structural changes, and that the downward
trend of growth was accompanied by increased government
involvement in this process (Donges, 1980; Wolter, 1984).
And it was in the fifties that West Germany faced unexampled
adjustment requirements in order to recover from postwar
stagnation; in particular, the capital stock, which was_ 4 —















































Source: IMF, International Monetary Statistics, current
issues; own calculations.
destroyed during the war or dismantled by the victorious
Allies, had to be rebuilt, and millions of refugees, first
from the old Eastern areas of the former Germany and then
from the German Democratic Republic, had to be absorbed.
In all four countries, economic growth has been accom-
panied by notable changes in the production and employment
structure at the three-sector level. The general trends have
been a relative decline in the primary and the secondary
sector and a relative increase in the tertiary sector (as
measured by these sectors' shares in gross value added and
employment). West Germany has resembled this pattern as from
the mid-seventies onwards only; in previous years this coun-
try had become "over-industrialized" if compared to value-
added and employment shares derived from international
cross-section regression analyses (Fels, Schatz, Wolter,
1971).- 5 -
The primary sector will continue to lose relative weight
in the advanced economies (mainly due to effects de-
scribed by Engel's law), while there will be a fundamental
shift in production and employment from the secondary to the
tertiary sector (as result of the ongoing move towards the
information-and-communication(s)-based society). As illus-
tration, Table 2 gives the estimates for West Germany up to
the year 2000. It should be noted that, in the secondary
sector, the share of value added declines more rapidly than
the respective share of labour; in the tertiary sector the
opposite can be observed. Hence, labour productivity dif-
ferentials between the secondary and the tertiary sector
become smaller over a period of time.
Table 3a highlights structural developments in the four
EC countries since 1970, with the manufacturing sector being
more disaggregated and the services sector split up between
market and non-market activites. The co-efficients shown are
individual sectors' rates of growth in the period 1977-83
relative to growth rates in the years from 1970 to 1976,
standardized by setting this ratio equal to unity for gross
domestic product. Manufacturing has indeed followed the
general trend described by the three-sector hypothesis in
all four countries. The ratios for the building and con-
struction sector are biased in an upward direction in West
Germany as result of a rapid expansion of public investment
during most of the period under consideration. With regard
to services, only Italy exhibits an increase which is dis-
tinctively above average; in the other countries services
expanded more or less with the overall growth rate . The
fact that growth of value added in fuel and power products
accelerated in all countries is certainly due to the rising
prices of energy in that time and, in the case of the oil-
importing countries, to the endeavours to discover and pro-
duce oil substitutes.
In Germany, "market services" are, in terms of value add-
ed, between three and four times as large as "non-market- 6 -
Table 2: Structure of Production and Bnployment in West Germany
(per cent)






















































On the basis of a 3 per cent annual growth rate of per capita income. -
At current market prices. - Agriculture, forestry, and fishing; mining
and quarrying. - Manufacturing; electricity, gas, and water; construc-
tion. -
 eTrade, transport and communications; banking, insurance, and
real estate; public administration; other services.
Source: Donges, Klodt, Schmidt (1986); figures for 1985 have been
updated.Table 3a: Relative Growth Performance in Four EC Countries by Sectors , 1970-83
Sectors
Agricultural, forestry, fishing




- Non-ferrous minerals and mineral products
- Chemicals
- Fabricated metal products
- Agricultural and industrial machinery
- Office and data-processing machines,
precision and optical instruments
- Electrical engineering
- Transport equipment
- Paper and paperboard, printed matter
- Rubber and plastic products
- Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear






aGrowth rates 1976-83 in relation to those in 1970-76

























































































Source: Statistical Office of the European Communities, Eurostat, National Accounts. Current
issues; own calculations.- 8 -
It cannot be inferred from Table 3a whether success or
failure has occurred in "real" terms or whether the develop-
ment of value added has rather been based on changes in the
price structure of the economy. This aspect is of special
importance in times of severe price shocks. One should ex-
pect that in the period under consideration real prices of
non-tradable goods expanded in oil-producing countries, like
the United Kingdom, relative to other countries (Corden,
Neary, 1982). Indeed, the development of relative prices in
building and construction, market services and non-market
services confirm this hypothesis (Table 3b): Non-tradables
exhibit a major price increase in the United Kingdom re-
lative to the other countries and relative to manufactures
and agricultural products . The same applies to energy pro-
duction (oil) .relative to the two other tradables sectors.
The overall speed of structural change of production
during the period under consideration has increased in Fran-
ce and Italy, while it remained almost constant in the Unit-
ed Kingdom and declined significantly in Germany (Table 4) .
Structural change in Germany, by far the highest in the
first half of the seventies, has been the lowest in recent
2
years . With regard to employment, structural shifts were
similar, though there was a marked slowing-down in the Unit-
ed Kingdom. The speed of structural change does, of course,
not necessarily indicate whether it has been adequate to
cope with current adjustment requirements. From the fact
that the rate of economic growth has decreased and the rate
of unemployment has increased throughout the sample coun-
tries (and in other European countries as well) it may be
Non-market services seem to be an exception to this rule
in West Germany where the price increase was even more
pronounced than in the United Kingdom. However, this
reflects mainly the fact that salaries paid by the public
sector are not subject to market forces and increased
quite fast during most of the period under consideration.
2
A similar development for Sweden and the Netherlands has
been reported by Rodrik (1982) .Table 3b: The Sectoral Structure of Prices in Four EC Countries (1980 = 100)
Sectors
Agricultural, forestry, fishing




- Non-ferrous minerals and mineral products
- Chemicals
- Fabricated metal products
- Agricultural and industrial machinery
- Office and data-processing machines,
precision and optical instruments
- Electrical engineering
- Transport equipment
- Paper products, printed matter
- Rubber and plastic products
- Textiles, clothing, leather, footwear









































































































































































































































































Source: As table 3a; own calculations.- 10 -
Table 4: Speed of Structural Change (SCI)
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Source: See Table 3; own calculations.
inferred that the pace of structural change is not the only
indicator of successful adjustment.
2. The Manufacturing Industry
More light on the pattern of structural change is shed
by classifying manufacturing activities into strong, normal
and weak, depending on whether output grew faster than,
equal to, or slower than manufacturing average. This average
is reported in line 3 of Table 3a.
Two industries improved performance in the four coun-
tries between 1970 and 1983: food, beverages, tobacco as
well as paper, paperboard and printed matter. Two industries
did so in three countries: non-ferrous minerals and mineral
products (with the exception of France) and office and data-
processing machines (with the exception of West Germany). It
is interesting to see that the textiles industry performed
better than average in Italy and West Germany, which is an
indication for successful adjustment (behind the protective- 11 -
barriers of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement) to changing com-
parative advantage. The success of food and beverages has
been accompanied by a relative improvement of relative
prices since 1976 as compared to the first half of the sev-
enties, though not in West Germany (Table 3b). By contrast,
the relative prices of paper and printing products declined
in West Germany and remained constant in Italy.
Only one branch was below average industrial growth
performance in all countries, namely fabricated metal pro-
ducts. Transport equipment and electrical goods were so in
all countries but the United Kingdom, and agricultural and
industrial machinery in all but West Germany. The fact that
transport equipment suffered from a decline in relative
prices since 1976, can be ascribed to the energy price in-
creases which have induced demand to substitute large cars
for smaller ones. It should be noted, however, that the
level of aggregation in Tables 3a and 3b is quite high, as
the branch "transport equipment" includes industries with
very diverging economic performance: rapid shrinkage (ship-
building) , moderate growth (automobiles) and emerging dyna-
mism (aircraft production).
The indicator best suited for measuring economic per-
formance is probably the rate of return on capital. Again,
the development of the profitability of the capital stock is
much the same among European countries (Table 5). There has
been a decline of profitability of the capital stock since
the sixties in all countries except Italy, where rates of
return peaked in 1968 and 1969 (not shown here). As compared
to the United States, profit rates have been relatively
unstable in Europe, although the continuity of the downward
trend is worth noting.
The picture is somewhat misleading, though, the reason
being that measurement of profits as well as that of the
capital stock suffers from some intrinsic problems. West- 12 -

































TSIet returns as per cent of net capital stock (excluding construction) .
Capital stock and depreciation at current prices•
Source: Commission of the EC (1986); own calculations.
German companies, for example, have sold assets during the
past ten years in order to improve their cash balances. Such
earnings, which do not stem from production, are included in
Table 5. Recalculation of rates of return in order to ex-
clude the bias resulting from non-production activites re-
veals that the decline of profit rates in Germany has been
quite similar to that shown in Table 5 for the United King-
dom. The adjusted yield on fixed assets in Germany was 13.6
per cent in 1966 and 4.1 per cent in 1983, with a trough of
3.7 per cent in 1982 (Dicke, Trapp, 1984). Even these fi-
gures do not say too much about the investment climate in
Germany, unless compared to returns on alternative invest-
ments, as for instance in the financial sector. Comparison
of the above-mentioned returns on fixed capital with the
real rate of interest on bonds show positive differentials
of more than 9 percentage points for the second half of the
sixties and of about 3 percentage points for the seventies.
It was only in the early eighties, when the returns on fixed
capital declined and the real interest rate on financial
capital increased, that the differential became negative
(1981: -2.5 percentage points; 1983: -0.7 percentage
points).iuf
- 13 -
The industry structure of returns on the capital stock
is given in Table 6, again for West Germany as an illustra-
tive example. The trend has been distinctly downwards across
the board. In 1981, the last year for which data are avail-
able, some industries, such as iron and steel and non-fer-
rous metals, incurred marked losses. Profits were remarkably
low in other industries such as chemicals, engineering, and
textiles. Even the more successful industries, such as fur-
niture, plastic products, or wood processing, might have had
difficulties in attracting investors in 1981, because the
real rates of interest on financial assets were about 6 per
cent at that time.
Whether or not headways in the adjustment process have
been made can also be derived from the evolution of capital
productivity. If adjustment is forward-looking the new in-
vestments enlarge productive capacities, incorporate a capi-
tal-saving technological progress, and ultimately lead to
product innovations; in this case, capital productivity
would increase. If adjustment is defensive, the new invest-
ments substitute capital for labour; in this case, capital
productivity would decline .
Table 7 provides information about the evolution of
capital productivity in the manufacturing industry, in com-
parison to that of the gross manufacturing product, of the
working time and of the capital intensity, before and after
the first oil price explosion in 1973. The following picture
2
emerges for France, the United Kingdom and West Germany :
- Manufacturing in all countries lost considerable
momentum after 197 3 in terms of growth in gross value
added at constant prices.
A caveat is in order: Problems of identification arise
when adjustment to declining profits is carried out by
reducing the capital stock. In this case the "law of di-
minishing returns" would lead to an increase of the meas-
ured capital productivity.
2
Data on Italy were not available.- 14 -
Table 6 - Pates of Return on Tangible Assets in Selected West German
Industries (per cent)
Industry

























































































Source; Dicke, Trapp (1984).- 15 -
- There was a tendency to cut working hours in the
seventies, most notably so in the United Kingdom and
West Germany. The number of hours a plant operates per
day or week has not been increased accordingly, so that
capital utilization was lower than it would have
otherwise been and capital productivity continued to
decline.
- The increase in the capital-intensity of manufacturing
production, which took place before 1973, slowed down
afterwards only in West Germany.
Table 7 Growth and Productivity Change in Manufacturing:
Before and After 197 3
a




























Source: OECD (1986). For West Germany: own calculations from statis-
tics of the Federal Statistical Office, the Council of Econo-
mic Experts and the Ifo-Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung.
Recent information on West Germany available on a more
disaggregated level for the period 1979-85 corroborates
these findings (Schmidt, Gundlach, Klodt, 1986). The
branches which increased capital productivity most include
chemicals, plastic materials, office and data processing
equipment, and aircraft and aerospace. However, this should- 16 -
not conceal the fact that a number of industries have ad-
justed by simultaneously reducing employment and increasing
their capital-intensity. Cases in point are shipbuilding,
clothing, wood products, musical instruments and sport goods
as well as other consumer goods industries facing stiff
competition from developing countries .
Ill. Why Do Industries Decline or Rise?
Profit rates as discussed above do not tell the whole
story of the rise and decline of industries: Measurement is
extremely controversial and it only takes account of big
companies which have to report on their performance as they
see it; moreover, future prospects as well as past perform-
ance have different sets of determinants. Some of these
determinants are strongly influenced by governments, like
foreign trade protection and domestic subsidisation; some of
them consist of international shifts in comparative advan-
tage which are, in a sense, "natural" (because there is
hardly a way of escaping); and some are, at a first glance,
handmade, like the technical progress, the speed of which
depends on the intensity and the efficiency of R&D.
1. Selected Performance Indicators
a. Sectoral Growth Orientation and Competitiveness
The Commission of the European Community recently ana-
2
lysed the growth performance of seven member countries by
branches, grouped according to the paths of domestic real
demand in Europe, in Japan and in the United States during
the period 1972-82. The details are given in Table 8.
Branches facing strong demand enjoyed average annual in-
It should be noted that calculations of the capital-pro-
ductivity developments are quite sensitive to the period
chosen and to business fluctuations.
The four countries studied here as well as Belgium, Den-
mark and the Netherlands.- 17 -





























































































lumbers in brackets refer to the
well as the USA and Japan in per
Source: Buigues, Goybet (1985a).- 18 -
creases ranging from 4.9 per cent (Germany) to 7.1 per cent
(Italy). Medium demand expansion was between 0.3 per cent
(United Kingdom) and 2.8 per cent (Italy). Weak demand
sectors expanded on average at annual rates of between 2.6
per cent (Italy) and -2.1 per cent (United Kingdom). This
classification does not "fit very well in all cases. For
example, in Italy three out of the four weak-demand indus-
tries showed relative buoyancy; the achievement of a strong
international competitiveness in textiles and clothing as
well as in small-scale steel production spared this country
the crisis which affected these two sectors elsewhere. On
the other hand, Buigues and Goybet (1985a) have shown that
European performance came close to the development of world
demand, by contrast, demand in Japan expanded more rapidly
in all three industry categories, whereas demand in the
United States grew slightly faster in the medium and weak
industries and slower in the industries with strongly ex-
panding demand.
In view of the on-going debate in Europe about the in-
ternational competitiveness of its industries, it may be
interesting to link the above-mentioned demand indicators
with the technology content of production and with changes
in foreign trade specialization. Table 9 reveals two inter-
esting features:
Firstly, European exports tended to be strong - both in
1983 and over the previous eleven years - in low or
medium technology products and in sectors with slowly or
moderately expanding demand. The chemical industry is
the only exception to this rule.
Secondly, the success of non-European suppliers on the
European market seem to correlate negatively with Euro-
pean successes on foreign markets. In two of the three
strongly expanding sectors (offices and data processing
The technology content refers to OECD classifications as
far as possible; otherwise, information on German tech-







Office and data processing machines
Electrical engineering
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Source: As table 8; own estimates.- 20 -
machines, electrical engineering) , the performance of
non-Europeans is better than that of the Europeans;
these sectors happen to display a technology content
above average.
A regional breakdown of revealed comparative advantage
(RCA) by and large confirms these trends (Table 10) . In
1983, measured comparative advantage can be detected mainly
in the fields of basic and investment industries (mineral
and metal products, mechanical engineering, motor vehicles).
Comparative disadvantage is revealed by those consumer goods
which are relatively labour-intensive (and in which develop-
ing countries are strong exporters), but also by high-tech-
nology goods such as office and data processing machinery,
which is the world's growth industry par excellence.
b. Adjustment under Changing Terms of Trade
As said at the outset, the European economies have been
subjected to a number of severe external shocks since the
early seventies. Long-lasting shocks such as sharp exchange-
rate fluctuations, oil price hikes, increased protectionism
or the upsurge of new competitors have structural effects -
if some industries are in a position to adjust prices before
adapting output, while others would go bankrupt if they had
to make price concessions and therefore would have to reduce
the degree of capacity utilization. Consequently, there
would be a notable dispersion among branches with regard to
both revealed comparative advantage (in constant prices) and
terms of trade; moreover, changes in revealed comparative
advantage would have a different sign than changes in terms
of trade.
Information on these points is shown in the Annex Fig-
ures A6 to A8 for France, Italy and West Germany, at the
level of 30 manufacturing branches, for the periods 1965-73- 21 -
and 1978-84 . Remarkably, the industry-specific terms of
trade exhibit a tendency to converge over the two periods in
Italy and West Germany. In the latter country, the average
change of the terms of trade during 1978-84 was virtually
zero along with a very low interindustry variance, while it
was distinctly positive during 1965-73 along with a high
dispersion. In a sense, this may reflect the growing im-
portance of intraindustry trade, because the terms of trade
of close substitutes are likely to change more or less uni-
formly. The oil-price increases during the seventies might
also be a part of the explanation, as they contributed to a
deterioration of terms of trade in the second period under
consideration. By contrast, the changes in real revealed
comparative advantage show much less of a convergence
across-the-board in each of the three countries.
Cases in which branches significantly improved their
international competitiveness and at the same time achieved
better terms of trade are rare. In the first period
(1965-73) , there was no such case in Italy, and only two
branches can be detected in France (fine ceramics, food and
beverages) and in West Germany (stone, sand and clay, non-
ferrous metals). None of these branches kept this position
in the second period (1978-84) . Now, just one branch with
the above-mentioned characteristics can be shown in each of
these countries: fabricated metal products in France and
2
Italy and motor vehicles in West Germany .
As opposed to these "entirely positive" cases there are
also only a few "entirely negative" cases, which lost ground
regarding both relative prices and quantities. Again, the
affected branches varied from the former period to the lat-
ter, with the exception of the Italian manufacturers of
The United Kingdom has been excluded due to lack of data
for the first period.
2
Only changes in real revealed comparative advantage and in
terms of trade exceeding 10 per cent have been taken into
account. The same applies to the next paragraph.- 22 -
musical instruments, toys and the like which were subjected
to heavy adjustment pressure during both periods. There were
two more Italian industries in this situation in the period
1978-84 (motor vehicles, printed matter), also two in West
Germany (foundries, chemicals), but none in France.
There is more continuity, and a marked predominance,
with regard to branches with losses in international com-
petitiveness in spite of a positive terms-of-trade develop-
ment ("product-impacted group") and branches with gains in
real revealed comparative advantage combined with a deteri-
oration of terms of trade ("price-impacted group"). The
"product-impacted group" became smaller in France (from 12
branches in 1965-73 down to 8 branches in 1978-84) and West
Germany (from 11 down to 4 branches) , while its size in-
creased in Italy (from 5 to 9 branches). Three branches were
affected in both periods in France (chemicals, office and
data processing machines, leather products), two in Italy
(electrical engineering, textiles) and three in West Germany
(iron and steel, precision engineering, glass products). As
to the "price-impacted group", now it is Italy where the
size was reduced over time (from 10 down to 5 branches) ,
while it augmented in France (from 3 to 6 branches) and West
Germany (from 2 to 6 branches) . None of these six German
branches were in a similar situation in 1965-73. In France,
continuity applies to one branch (musical instruments, toys
and the like), in Italy to three (shipbuilding, aircraft and
aerospace, food and beverages) .
The main conclusion from this evidence is that today
there is a greater vulnerability to external shocks across-
the-board. The need for adjustment is no longer confined to
(labour-intensive) consumer goods industries; it now also
challenges (capital-intensive) investment goods industries,
It should be noted that the classification of industries
in one group or another is sensitive to the period chosen.
For a divergent grouping of German industries, referring
to the period 1979-85, see Schmidt, Gundlach, Klodt
(1986).- 23 -
which are going to make similar experiences with interna-
tional competitive pressures - experiences which have been
made by the producers of consumer goods since the sixties.
The problems are even more manifold, because the European
investment goods industries do face competition not only
from the newly industrializing countries, but also from
innovating industrial countries, in particular Japan.
c. Inadequacies in Destructuring
It appears that the EC countries have specialized in
those industrial activities which face low domestic demand
growth and have a relatively low technology content . Both
characteristics explain why the EC has lost some ground in
international competition with the United States and Japan,
in particular in microelectronics and other new technology
fields, while the adjustment pressures caused by the
export-oriented, newly-industrializing countries have not
eased off so far. This confirms our above-mentioned presump-
tion that the restructuring both of production and of the
capital stock towards more viable and profitable activities
in the medium run has been inadequate in the EC.
This inadequacy becomes evident when one looks at the
evolution of labour costs and of the application of new
technologies. As regards unit labour costs, it turns out
that they rose faster, or declined less, in the moderate-
and weak-demand sectors than in the strong-demand industries
in all countries studied (Table 11) ; from an economic point
of view, unit labour costs should have fallen the most in
the weak-demand sectors. It is only in recent years that
wage moderation has contributed to a change in this trend.
Moreover, all four countries exhibit a relatively narrow
wage structure. The co-efficients of sectoral dispersion of
labour costs per hour varied, in 1982, between 0.11 (Ita-
ly) and 0.17 (the United Kingdom); by comparison they were
See Klodt (1987) and Pelkmans (1986) for similar findings.- 24 -
Table 10: Index of Revealed Comparative Advantage
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Source: As table 3; own calculations.- 25 -
Table 11 : Real Unit Labour Costs 1972/73 - 1981/82






















Source: Buigues, Goybet (1985b).
almost twice as high in Japan and the United States (Bui-
gues, Goybet, 1985b, p. 47). There is no indication that
this has changed recently; if anything, wage differentials
have been compressed even more from below in the course of
collective bargaining, whereby labour-intensive, low-skilled
workers have continued to be driven out of the market by
foreign competitors (if not effectively protected).
As far as technology is concerned, what matters in the
ongoing technological race is innovation rather than inven-
tion, innovation being defined as the commercial application
of new technologies (i.e. of inventions). The size of R & D
activities is roughly similar among leading industrial coun-
tries, around 2.5 per cent of gross domestic product (Klodt,
1987). Given a country's ability to absorb foreign tech-
nologies, inventions made in other countries can be acquired
through licensing arrangements; in fact, all industrial
countries make use of this opportunity (Glismann, Horn,
1986).
With respect to innovation, the EC countries are cred-
ited for important achievements in nuclear power stations,
aircraft industries, high-speed trains, military equipment,
and rocket launching (backed by massive government support),
along with a traditionally strong competitive position in- 26 -
chemicals, Pharmaceuticals, medical technology, industrial
machinery and motor cars. These achievements are considered
by many as indicative of prevailing technological strength.
And yet, losses in foreign sales and increased import
competition in various high-technology fields, particularly
in informations and communications industries, lend support
to the presumption that the translation of inventions into
commercially viable products and services has become more
difficult in Europe, notwithstanding remarkable successes on
the market place of individual companies in almost every
country. As Table 12 shows, the four countries considered
here have lost ground on the world market over the past
twenty years. Where new technologies were applied, the pri-
mary objective of many firms has often been the reduction
of labour costs, i.e. process innovations were given priori-
ty over product innovations, though it is the latter which
Table 12: Comparative Advantage Indicators of Exports With a
High-Technology Content































Source; Commission of the EC (1982).- 27 -
has the greatest potential for resuming economic dynamism.
All this holds true also for Germany, a country often con-
sidered to be in a technologically leading position (Donges,
Klodt, Schmidt, 1986, pp. 10-12).
Recently, the European high-tech industry has recon-
quered lost ground to some extent. Cases in point are tele-
communications equipment, mechanical engineering and motor
car manufacturing. Intensified R & D efforts and more ag-
gressive marketing strategies have been important factors
behind this improvement. Moreover, the soaring U.S. dollar
(until early 1985) provided European firms excellent export
opportunities, while sheltering them to a certain degree
from competitive imports. However, with European currencies
now appreciating in real terms against the U.S. dollar,
there are renewed fears that the technological catching-up
process may again slow down and that many companies, after
all, may prove too weak to cope with the challenges of rapid
change in modern technologies. This is said to justify an
active role of governments in this area, each for itself or
in co-ordination .
2. Technology Policies
In all European countries, government supports R & D
activities of private firms. The fraction of industrial
R & D spending financed by government has been amounting to
17 per cent in West Germany, 23 per cent in France and 30
per cent in the United Kingdom in the early eighties (Klodt,
As to the co-ordinated efforts, two major projects have
got under way recently: One is the EC-sponsored "European
Strategic Programme for Research and Development in In-
formation Technology" (known as ESPRIT and launched in
1984); the other one is a ministerial agreement involving
18 European countries and the EC Commission to co-operate
in the promotion of high-tech ventures by private com-
panies (called EUREKA and started in 1985) .- 28 -
1987) . The distribution by industry of government R & D
support reveals some striking similarities (Table 13): Air-
craft and aerospace industries are on top of national re-
search priorities in all countries, with France being the
leader and Germany, having half the share of France, at the
end of the line. Second is electrical engineering in all
countries, though with less variation in the shares of gov-
ernment funding. The structure of private R & D efforts
differs in two ways from that of public support. Firstly,
aircraft and aerospace is of much less importance for pri-
vate R & D; the interest of German producers in aircraft-
related research ranks far behind that which goes into this
sector in the other countries. Secondly, private R & D
spending is more evenly distributed among industries than
government R & D subsidies.
Another striking feature of national technology policies
in Europe is that the governments channel their R & D sub-
sidies to a large extent into similar sectors. On the basis
of ten industries (not shown here), which absorb most of the
R & D funding in the countries studied, high and significant
rank correlations with regard to public support can be
found, namely r = 0.87 between France and West Germany in
1983, r = 0.85 between the United Kingdom and West Germany,
and r = 0.90 between France and the United Kingdom (Klodt,
1987) . When compared to the United States or Japan, the
ranking of priorities is quite similar. Evidently, each
government seems to believe that it can create its own win-
ners in the technology race, at the expense of foreign com-
petitors. Whether or not this belief will turn out to be
correct remains to be seen. But the more countries support
the same lines of production the less probable it will be-
For comparison, the government's share is much higher in
the United States (32 per cent in 1983) and much lower in
Japan (less than 2 per cent). The high U.S. share reflects
the importance of defence-related R & D; Japan's low share
may be ascribed to the fact that a large part of private
R & D activities is carried out by universities (which are












































































































































Source: Klodt (1987).- 30 -
come that the expected high rates of return will material-
ize. On the contrary, there is a risk of a global overin-
vestment in certain high-technology industries which would
easily lead to excess capacities and new adjustment problems
in the future. After all, several of the nowadays declining
industries were, at some time in the past, growth indus-
tries, and governments of various European countries pro-
moted them for this very reason.
Mainstream economics would in any case suggest that
government technology policies should concentrate on areas
in which important non-pecuniary externalities can be ex-
pected; basic research is a case in point. In this sense,
one would expect that the more prudently a government hand-
les R & D, the less will public R & D funding across in-
dustries be correlated to private R & D spending. In Europe,
West Germany comes relatively closest to this expectation:
the rank correlation is moderate (r = 0.55) and statisti-
cally insignificant. In France (r = 0.73) and the United
Kingdom (r = 0.92), however, the co-efficients are distinct-
ly higher and significant (Klodt, 1987).
3. The Rise of Common Policies and the Decline of an
Industry: Iron and Steel
One aspect of growing importance regarding structural
change and industrial adjustment is the international co-
ordination of (economic) policies. Such co-ordination has a
long tradition in post-war Europe, and the iron and steel
industry is a prominent case in point. Even before the
formation of the European Economic Community in 1957, Eu-
ropean steel policies were formally co-ordinated by the
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), established in
1951. The ECSC had, inter alia, the task of planning for the
future of steel industries, to advise firms regarding in-
vestment production and foreign trade, and to forecast
developments in steel markets. In addition, the ECSC has
been entitled:- 31 -
- to set production quotas in case of demand slacks;
- to distribute steel output in cases of supply bottle-
necks (among industries as well as among member coun-
tries) ;
- to shape policies regarding international trade in steel
products;
- to fix steel prices.
At the same time the ECSC treaty rigorously forbids sub-
sidization, or any other kind of discrimination, by member
countries "in whatever manner this might occur" (Article 4).
Structural changes in steel production leading to to-
day's steel crises, and to the corresponding crisis manage-
ment of the ECSC, has many roots (Tarr, 1986). Firstly, the
rate of growth of world steel demand has been virtually zero
since the first oil price shock in 1973-74; in fact, the
demand by industrial countries has been declining in real
terms by some 2 per cent per annum since then, and the de-
veloping countries just filled the gaps. Secondly, there
have been quite remarkable changes in the international
structure of comparative advantage since the mid-seventies,
with Japan emerging as the big low cost newcomer on world
steel markets. Developing countries, first of all South
Korea and Brazil, followed Japan as major competitors to the
classical steel producers in the EC (and in the United
States alike). Of all cost factors explaining changes in
comparative advantage, such as those related to the input of
coal, energy, capital and manpower, the unit labour costs
exhibit by far the highest degree of variance among coun-
tries; the productivity advantages of the leading industrial
countries have been neutralized by too high wages when com-
pared to the newcomers (Tarr, 1986). Widespread and per-
sistent overcapacity of the European steel industry, which
did not disappear in periods of economic recovery, was the
consequence.- 32 -
The history of the most recent crisis management of the
ECSC starts as early as January 1977, when the EC Commission
organized a system of voluntary production and delivery
quotas on six steel product categories ("Simonet Plan",
named after the responsible Commissioner). As the quotas
were set rather generously and as they were virtually ignor-
ed by the extremely efficient North-Italian mini-mills, a
more dirigistic "structural crisis cartel" was implemented
in May 1977 ("Davignon Plan", named after Simonet
1s succes-
sor) . All major steel firms of the EC became part of this
cartel (called "Eurofer") . It provides compulsory domestic
minimum prices (set above world market prices) for key steel
products, tight production and delivery quotas as well as
import licensing. A system of "basic prices" for imports
from third countries introduced in 1978 was to enable the
Commission to define cases of dumping by foreign suppliers
clearly without showing additional proof. In support of this
cartel the Commission initiated (or forced) "voluntary"
export restraints from third countries, such as Japan, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Spain, Brazil, South Korea among others.
The production quota system was severely tightened in
1980, when the EC Commission declared the "manifest crisis"
according to ECSC Article 58. Moreover, a code of subsidies
was implemented with the aim of getting national subsidiza-
tion under control. The whole regulatory system was to be in
force until mid-1981; after its renewal it was to be phased
out at the end of 1985 at the latest. But as European steel
Cartels (and combines) among European steel producers have
a long tradition. For example, in 1926 the IRG or "Inter-
nationale Rohstahlgemeinschaft" (International Crude Steel
Association) was founded, one of the objectives being to
close some European markets for foreign suppliers. Car-
telization was still going strong after World War II had
broken out. After the war, the ECSC steel producers to-
gether with UK producers formed the "Briisseler Export-
konvention" (Brussels Export Convention) in 1953 to agree
upon minimum prices, cost-plus calculations, terms of
payment and other restrictive practices in exports (Glis-
mann, 1975).- 33 -
industry continued suffering from overcapacities (actual-
ly in the order of 20 million tons, despite capacity reduc-
tion in recent years) and as many firms continued incurring
huge operating losses, the system has been prolonged: until
the end of 1987 for production quotas and import protection,
and until the end of 1988 and of 1990 for subsidies (depend-
ing on the kind of subsidy).
The ways in which these interventions work can be illus-
trated formally as shown in the following graph (Herdmann,
Weiss 1985) . For the sake of simplicity the European steel
market has been reduced to contain only two suppliers: I,
the efficient supplier operating at K costs; II, the in-
efficient supplier operating at K costs. Subsidization
makes K the relevant cost function for II's investment
decision. Without quotas, however, production would be x.
with I being the only supplier. Minimum prices (basic prices
for imports) are then set at k-. Still, I would supply x_
with hardly a chance for II. Quota regulation x~,~ assures
that both steel producers get their "fair share" of the
Figure 1
The. European Steel Market
Price of
steel
Quantity of steel- 34 -
market, but obviously, the efficient producer is discrimi-
nated against.
Indeed, German steel producers have objected again and
again to this system of interventions. They have complained
about the high degree of subsidization (though two German
producers, Arbed-Saarstahl and the Bavarian Maxhutte, have
benefitted from such public aids), arguing that interna-
tional competition is distorted; and they have strongly
criticized the system of production quotas on the grounds
that it does not take into account that German steel-makers
rank high on the international ladder of comparative advan-
tage and that they have undertaken much more efficiency-
raising adjustment than their competitors from other EC
countries.
The impact of European (and German) steel•policies has
been negative on any account. The adverse effects include
(1) a misallocation within European steel production towards
the less efficient producers, (2) an exponential increase of
the capital stock in spite of an exponential decrease of the
rate of capital utilization between 1955 and 1980 (Dicke,
Glismann, 1984a) , and (3) a trade diversion away from third
countries. The process of restructuring has been unduly
delayed under these circumstances. One should add the dead-
weight losses intrinsic to subsidies, quotas and price ad-
ministration. Moreover, there has been increasing tension
among EC member countries, emanating from attempts and ac-
tions by several producers to evade production quotas and to
cheat on official prices.
4. Lessons from West Germany
Germany is generally regarded as a country which has
brought about the required overall structural changes with
relative ease (Renshaw, 1986). This was true in the fifties.
But afterwards, this economy was increasingly plagued with
adjustment problems, so that the annual rate of growth of- 35 -
potential output, declined to less than 2 per cent in the
first half of the current decade.
a. Slowdown of Adjustment
The adjustment problems are partly economic, partly
institutional. The economic side is related to the notorious
shifts in the international division of labour. These shifts
were felt perhaps more intensively in Germany than in other
EC countries because of the "over-industrialization" which
had taken place before, effectively spurred by a long-last-
ing undervaluation in real terms of the deutschmark through-
out the fifties and sixties. When the Bretton-Woods system
of adjustable exchange rates collapsed in the early seven-
ties and was replaced by a system of (managed) floating, the
deutschmark appreciated in real terms, thereby increasing
foreign competition on the domestic market, including com-
petition from developing countries.
The total share of imports from developing countries in
the apparent consumption of manufactures in Germany has in-
creased, since 1970, by about the same relative magnitude as
did the total share of all imports. The overall share of
developing countries is relatively low (Table Al). However,
market penetration by these countries has grown faster than
average in labour-intensive consumer goods such as leather,
textiles, clothing, musical instruments, and toys; ship-
building is another sector in which the share of develop-
ing-country imports in apparent consumption has risen rapid-
ly. All these import pressures occurred at a time in which
Germany, as other European countries, was facing persistent
macroeconomic difficulties in terms of slow and erratic
growth, unprecedented high unemployment and accelerating
inflation, let alone the premature obsolescence of large
parts of the capital stock due to the rise in energy prices
after 1973.- 36 -
The institutional side of Germany's adjustment problems
has two major features. One refers to the labour markets,
the other to government activities. The German labour market
has traditionally been subject to collective bargaining in
the course of which the wages and supplements agreed upon
between labour unions and employers' associations tend to
become nationwide mandatory minimum wages for all labour and
firms in the respective industry. In addition, many labour-
market regulations have been tightened or newly implemented
during the last fifteen years in pursuit of well-intended
social objectives (unemployment compensation, allowances to
employees regarding vacations, sick and maternity leave,
protection of labour against dismissal, severance pay to
laid-off workers, and the like).
As long as productivity grew fast and the economy ran at
full employment, these labour-market arrangements did not
act as a break to adjustment. However, under the conditions
of productivity slowdown, which have prevailed in Germany
(and in other European countries) in the recent past, it has
become evident that the labour market has lost the flexi-
bility which is needed if adjustment to changing supply and
demand conditions is to take place promptly - nationwide as
well as in specific regions, industries and companies (Don-
ges, 1985). The numerous institutional rigidities built into
the labour markets are perhaps the major source of what has
become known as "Eurosclerosis" (Giersch, 1985), i.e. the
slowness in industrial modernization, economic diversifica-
tion (towards services), technological innovation and job
creation, even in periods of cyclical upswing.
As to government activities in Germany, they virtually
exploded in the seventies. The share of government consump-
tion in net national product rose from 14.4 per cent in 1970
to 20.7 per cent in 1980 (1985: 20.6 per cent). Similar
rates of increase could be observed for para-fiscal institu-
tions as well as for the state-run social security system- 37 -
(pensions, health, unemployment), which implied ever-rising
payroll taxes on the workers
1 gross wages (half of these
taxes are formally paid by the employer in this basically
pay-as-you-go system). The compulsory contributions to the
social security system has amounted to 35.2 per cent in 1986
as compared to 32.4 per cent in 1980, and 26.5 per cent in
1970; today, they are about the highest in the OECD area.
This development reflects the attempt of successive govern-
ments to make Germany a welfare state as encompassing as
possible, which have eroded the link between individual
efforts and rewards and thereby reduced the responsiveness
to changes in the economic environment.
The capability to adjust has been further weakened by
the governments' readiness to meet the demands of organized
special interest groups (some of which behaved in the best
German guild tradition of the Middle Ages) for import pro-
tection, subsidies and regulations. Meanwhile more than half
of the German economy (in value added terms) is affected by
these kinds of government interventions (Donges, Schatz,
1986). They obstruct market entry for newcomers and distort
competition and thus inevitably perpetuate structural rigi-
dities.
On a-priori grounds, one would expect that the increased
institutional inflexibility would hurt primarily those in-
dustries which experience a slow productivity growth and
face a weak domestic demand. The indices of revealed com-
parative advantage and their development should reflect such
a differential impact. However, they do not. As Table A2
shows :
- the variation of RCAs among industries has been declin-
ing rather than increasing, both in total trade and in
trade with developing countries;
See also UNIDO (1986) where the factor orientation of RCAs
is considered.- 38 -
- the comparative disadvantage of German industries was
concentrated in industries producing close to final
demand, in addition to a few basic industries;
- the pattern of comparative disadvantage was roughly the
same for total trade and for trade with developing coun-
tries, though less pronounced (i.e. with less variance)
regarding total trade.
For an explanation one should remember that the speed of
structural change in the economy as a whole has slowed down
over the past fifteen years (Table 4) . Recalculating the
structural change index for manufacturing provides addi-
tional confirmation (Table 14) . The slowdown of structural
change implies that declining industries do not shrink as
could have been expected, and that growth industries are not
as dynamic as one would wish them to be. This then also
becomes manifest in the foreign trade performance, as cap-
tured by the RCA-indices.
Table 14: Speed of Structural Change (SCI) in Manufacturing

























Source: As table 3; own calculations.- 39 -
All in all, it can be said that Germany's production
structure became too rigid just at a time when far-reaching
changes in economic conditions demanded higher flexibility,
so that the actual speed of adjustment in Germany was too
slow (Schmidt et al., 1984). The other European countries,
perhaps with the exception of Switzerland, made a similar
experience. In spite of many official declarations about the
necessity to remove the existing distortions from product
and factor markets, it has been difficult in Germany (and
elsewhere) to transform this recognition into appropriate
policy changes. In particular, public subsidies have not
been reduced in recent years; instead they rose from DM
100.5 billion in 1980 to DM 121.5 billion in 1985, equiva-
lent to 6.6 per cent of gross domestic product (Donges,
Schatz, 1986, table 3). Thus, the trend observed in previous
years has continued (Table A3) . In France, Italy and the
United Kingdom subsidization also moved along an upward
trend (Messerlin, 1986).
Though the bulk of subsidization in Germany (and other
European countries) goes to non-industrial sectors (with
housing, transportation, and agriculture at the top) , in-
dustry is also affected. Sometimes the objective is to as-
sist ailing industries (coal mining, shipbuilding, iron and
steel), sometimes the government is eager to promote so-
called growth industries (aircraft and aerospace). Aircraft
production and shipbuilding are outstanding as each of them
receive more than 30 per cent of its value added as a sub-
sidy (Table A3). It should also be noted that these are the
only two industries within manufacturing which obtain the
bulk of subsidies through tailor-made programmes (Table
A4)
1.
Subsidy policies towards manufacturing are normally pur-
sued according to the "watering-can" principle, which
allows almost everybody to participate in any single
scheme. The different branches compete with each other in
order to get what they consider to be a "fair" share of
the respective subsidy programme. As Table A4 shows, sub-
sidies go to 26 branches and more in most cases.- 40 -
b. High Protection and Negative Adjustment
Taking domestic forms of protection (subsidies and re-
gulations) and foreign trade protection together, one can
sort out ten highly protected industries in Germany: Iron
and steel; shipbuilding; textiles; clothing; food, beverages
and tobacco; fine ceramics; pulp, paper and board; leather
products; non-ferrous metals; and aircraft and aerospace.
The situation is quite similar in the other European coun-
tries. Of these industries, only one can be considered to
belong to the group of growth industries: aircraft and aero-
2
space (Table A5) .
On the basis of the information given in Table A5, three
groups of industries can be defined: The first one includes
five "sunset industries"; in spite of having received con-
tinuous or even increasing protection, their sales perfor-
mance has deteriorated greatly. The second group consists of
four branches with declining sales expansion, but also with
a declining degree of protection; they may be labelled
"declining industries". The third group, containing only
aircraft and aerospace, has received continuous protection
until today and increased its sales significantly. Is this
the "phoenix industry"?
For the ten highly protected industries, a number of
common features emerge:
Most industries exhibit negative indices of revealed
comparative advantage over the whole period considered
(exceptions: iron and steel production; shipbuilding;
and fine ceramics before 1975). In some industries, RCA
For this section, see also Dicke, Glismann (1984b).
2
The other growth sectors are petroleum refinery, motor
vehicles, electrical engineering, plastic products, chemi-
cals, mechanical engineering, and precision engineering.- 41 -
values are negative and at the same time declining.
Shipbuilding, the only industry among the ten with posi-
tive RCAs throughout the years, lost international com-
petitiveness mainly in the sixties (and has not really
recovered since).
Import shares have been continuously increasing for most
industries, exceptions being shipbuilding, aircraft
industries and non-ferrous metals. The decline in ship-
building import shares after 1970 was brought about by a
reswitching of subsidization away from the subsidies
granted to shipping companies independently of whether
the shipyards were foreign or domestic towards subsidies
subject to the condition that the ships were domestical-
ly built. Declining import shares in aircraft and aero-
space between 1956 and 1973 reflect, to a large extent,
the establishment of new domestic aircraft plants in the
course of the rearmament of West Germany. Since 1973,
the import shares have increased again, mainly due to
the European Airbus project and to Jumbo-imports. Since
West Germany's share in the Airbus production is only
about 25 per cent and this aircraft is assembled in
France, German re-imports have increased due to the
rapidly rising sales of Airbus's jumbo jets.
There seems to be a mountain-shaped real value added
curve. In the course of the seventies the real produc-
tion of the highly protected industries started to de-
cline. This holds true especially for those industries
which are close to final consumption (textiles, cloth-
ing, fine ceramics, leather products).
The development of employment is even more remarkable
because only aircraft and aerospace has not been shrink-
ing continuously over the last decade. The longest way
down in employment has been experienced by shipbuilding,
leather products, and textiles (which have been declin-
ing since 1957) . More "recent" has been the decline of
non-ferrous metals (since 1970; it should be recalled- 42 -
that the city of Hamburg decided to heavily support
local direct investment of US firms in this branch at
the beginning of the long downswing).
Gross fixed assets have expanded in most cases by less
than average since 1960 (the exception being aircraft
and aerospace production). This may take by surprise
those who would expect fixed assets to decline the same
way employment did. However, capital intensification
normally takes place when relative factor prices favour
capital inputs rather than labour inputs. Indeed, wage
increases for all industries studied were higher than
productivity increases since the sixties; the rates of
real interest were, until the late seventies, relatively
low (mainly due to accelerating inflation). Hence, the
substitution of capital for labour was quite a normal
pattern. What is really surprising is the fact that the
ten industries expanded real capital inputs in spite of
the bad performance in terms of real value added. One
reason may be that subsidies to six of the ten indus-
tries have centred mainly on furthering fixed capital
formation; iron and steel, textiles, as well as pulp,
paper and board are cases in point (Juttemeier, 1987) .
Two of the ten highly protected industries are undoubt-
edly pure subsidy cases: shipbuilding and aircraft/aerospace
production. Without subsidization, the shipbuilding and air-
craft industry of the Federal Republic would be entirely
different today. Aircraft and aerospace operates under non-
market conditions on both sides: supply is subsidized and
In general, subsidies to manufacturing industries favoured
capital formation, whereas in agriculture, in mining, and
in private services subsidies favoured gross output (and
in transport and communications subsidies went to interme-
diate inputs, and to entrepreneurial incomes as well). The
subsidization of capital in the six industries mentioned
has even been far above manufacturing average.- 43 -
demand comes from government or state owned firms . In ship-
building the demand side at least works under more competi-
tion.
Government protection is one thing, the firms
1 adjust-
ment is another. This adjustment can take place in basically
two ways: one is "positive", i. e. forward-looking and effi-
ciency-orientated, the other is "negative", relying more on
collusion and other kinds of expropriation of third parties.
Positive adjustment would incorporate cost saving measures
on the input side, and innovation of products, markets and
techniques on the output side. Negative adjustment includes
merger and cartel activities as well as lobbying for (more)
protection.
Some of these indicators are hard to quantify. Accepting
Schumpeter's view that results of public and private acti-
vities can be measured by changes in the rate of economic
growth, one might take an industry's changes in the rate of
return as a proxy for adjustment, be it positive or nega-
tive. Due to a poor data base such clues are available for
only a few of the ten industries. For example, the develop-
ment of profit rates in iron and steel, non-ferrous metals,
textiles, and paper and board (Table 6) suggests that ad-
justment was not very successful.
Additional information is provided by Table 15. Indi-
cators of negative kinds of adjustment abound indeed:
When the Airbus's jumbos are publicly praised to be a
great achievement, which Europeans should be proud of, no
distinction is made between technical and commercial suc-
cess. Technically, these aeroplanes may rank high; commer-
cially, there is still a very long way to go before the
break-even-point is reached (if costs are ever recovered).
To date, cumulative public subsidization for the Airbus
industry (launch aid for projects, financial assistance
for deals with customers, economic risk insurance) is
reckoned to be at least DM 11 billion (Frankfurter All-
gemeine Zeitung, 10 February 1987). The situation is simi-
lar in the other countries which participate in the Air-
bus's projects, notably France and the United Kingdom.- 44 -
Merger activities were significantly above average in
the iron and steel industry (where between 1967 and 1971
more than one third of the existing firms merged) , in
the non-ferrous metals production, in aircraft and aero-
space industry (between 1967 and 1971 the share of merg-
ing firms was similar to that of the iron and steel
industry) as well as in the pulp, paper and board in-
dustry. The development of merging activities increased
relatively fast again in the iron and steel industry in
1973-82 (bearing in mind that the level of merging in
the period before reduced the merging potential con-
siderably) and in non-ferrous metals; it is also worth
mentioning the increase in the number of merging firms
in textiles as well as in food and beverages.
Cartelization was relatively high in iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, shipbuilding, leather products, and
fine ceramics; cartel intensity of textile producers has
been well above average since the beginning of the sev-
enties.
Mergers, cartels and protection are close substitutes as
regards their economic effects. However, the first two have
firms as major agents, while government more or less acts as
an accounting office. Protection, like subsidies or quotas,
depends both on firms demanding it and government and bu-
reaucracies working out their size and forms, which then
often are extended to all firms of an industry rather than
only protecting those who demanded protection.
Positive adjustment is even harder to analyse empiri-
cally. Taking inventive activities as an indicator of posi-
tive adjustment, it turns out that, with the exception of
aircraft and aerospace, invention has been of little im-
portance in the industries under observation (Table 15). And
in the "Phoenix case" the intensity of innovation in air-
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Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (current issues).- 47 -
the first year for which comparative information is avail-
able) .
The more intensive use of the relatively abundant factor
of production can be a form of positive adjustment, too.
This would imply a substitution of human capital for un-
skilled labour. Whether or not this happened may be inferred
from the development of the share of low skilled workers
1
income in total wages and salaries paid in an industry.
Again, only the aircraft and aerospace industry seems to
have adjusted more than the average manufacturing industry.
All other highly protected industries did not change input
structures faster than other industries. Adjustment has been
particularly slow in leather production (Table 15).
IV. Conditional Forecasts; Output Effects in Alternative
Adjustment Scenarios
1. International Cross Section Analysis: The Dynamic Aspect
The assessment of gains and losses due to different
adjustment performances is hard to quantify. There are too
many parameters, the sets of policies and policy repercus-
sions are too different, and they all differ among coun-
tries. Therefore, the following estimates are only intended
to give orders of magnitude.
In order to keep the calculations manageable, the number
of adjustment policies has been reduced to three: foreign
trade protection, government transfers (subsidies), and
rules and regulations . The protection variable is effective
tariff protection. The redistribution (subsidy) variable is
government transfers as per cent of gross domestic product.
The rules and regulations variable is the share of invest-
ment in GDP; this proxy is the only "indirect" evidence
included in this model.
For details on the method see also the appendix (pp.
64-67).- 48 -
The basic assumption underlying the rules-and-regula-
tions proxy is that the behaviour of economic agents, in
particular that of private investors, does not differ much
among countries; firms are supposed to react to incentives
and disincentives by and large in the same manner. Under
this assumption, an optimal number and kind of rules and
regulations would result in the same levels of investment
activities in all countries (other things equal). A country
having too many rules would thereby exhibit investment
shares which are low when compared to other countries. Three
caveats should be added, however: One is that in some coun-
tries (say, Italy), the economic agents may be more "used"
to artificial distortions of markets than the people in
other countries (say, West Germany). The second caveat re-
fers to the importance of the "underground economy" which
can be regarded as an adjustment of economic agents to too
many rules and regulations. Thirdly, too many rules and
regulations can bias the investment share also in an upward
direction, as widespread excess capacities in public utili-
ties suggest.
Four scenarios have been chosen:
One is the "maximum adjustment scenario" (MAS), in which
no protection and no subsidies are granted and the rules
and regulations are optimal.
In a "high adjustment scenario" (HAS) we assume that
effective tariff protection in all four countries is
reduced by 50 per cent from what is the "normal" level
(see below). Subsidies are supposed to be as low in the
countries considered here as they were in Japan in 1979.
Rules and regulations, as reflected in the investment
climate, are also assumed to be comparable to those in
Japan.
In the "central adjustment scenario" (CAS) the effective
rate of protection remains at the same level as in the
sixties. It is true that tariff protection has decreased- 49 -
since then. But non-tariff protection has increased
(Donges, 1986). All in all, the effective rate of tariff
protection chosen in the computations is likely to un-
derestimate the degree of today's foreign trade protec^-
tion. As for subsidies, they are supposed to remain at
1979 levels, measured in per cent of GDP; this means
that, in absolute terms, the subsidies would steadily
increase with the rate of economic growth. Rules and
regulations are assumed to create an investment climate
under which the countries under consideration can main-
tain the average investment level which they achieved in
the seventies.
- In a "low adjustment scenario" (LAS) we assume a re-
latively high level of foreign trade protection (the CAS
case plus 50 per cent), a subsidy share in GDP equal to
that of Sweden in 1979, and a set of rules and regula-
tions the result of which is a decline of investment to
the levels reached in the United Kingdom during the
seventies.
An important source of economic growth is technology ad-
vance. Such advance is - within certain limits which are set
by the potential to absorb foreign techniques or to invent -
the easier, the greater the distance to technologically
leading countries. This distance has been expressed as the
per capita income of each country relative to that of the
United States ("catching-up potential").
The computations are based on international cross-sec-
2
tion analyses of the determinants of economic growth . The
Each country's own technical progress can also be regarded
as being part of the investment activity; as such it is
effectively promoted, or restricted, by existing rules and
regulations.
2
The impact of the subsidy and the rules and regulations
variables are taken from cross-sections regression of 13
industrial countries. The impact of protection refers to
cross-section estimates of a sample of 47 developing and
industrial countries. The reason for using differentiated
estimates is the lack of complete data.- 50 -
results are presented in Table 16. In the HAS case, GDP per
capita would grow at an average annual rate of 3.8 per cent
in France, 5.3 per cent in Italy, 5.8 per cent in the United
Kingdom, and 3.6 per cent in West Germany until 1995 . The
differences are due to differing potentials for catching-up
technologically. The growth effects of protection, of trans-
fers, and of rules and regulations are the same for all
countries because of the described standardized assumptions.
Comparison with MAS reveals that HAS is not without costs of
maladjustment regarding protection as well as transfers; in
fact, HAS and LAS are closer to each other regarding the
protection effects than HAS and MAS.
LAS is the other standardized case, and the worst scena-
rio. It combines Swedish and British socio-economic condi-
tions and would lead to negative growth rates for the two
most advanced countries, France and Germany (-0.3 and -0.5
per cent a year respectively). Rules and regulations account
for the bulk of growth-retarding policies, which means that
protection and transfer increases are of less importance
than actual differences in the investment activities of
Japan (HAS) and Sweden/UK (LAS).
Individuality of countries is brought out in CAS. Per
capita income would increase at an annual rate of 1.1 per
cent in France, 2.8 per cent in Italy, 1.8 per cent in the
United Kingdom, and 1.4 per cent in West Germany. The re-
sults suggest that the negative growth impact of rules and
regulations is highest in the United Kingdom, and lowest in
France and Germany. Subsidies affect economic growth most
adversely in France.
These rates are obtained by adding up a + b + c + catch-
ing-up potential (for France: -0.9-0.8+5.0 +0.5).
The forecasting period is in fact 11 years, i.e. 1984-95,
as per capita incomes in purchasing power parities are
only available up to 1984.- 51 -
Table 16: Dynamic Output Effects of Adjustment in Four Countries: Aver-
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In terms of per capita incomes in U.S. dollars (measured
in purchasing power parities), Table 17 shows that their
increase would be considerable in all countries in the HAS
case. Moreover, real incomes per capita will exhibit a lower
degree of variance among countries in 1995 as compared to
1984, which is quite natural to happen if the relatively
less advanced countries make use of their higher potential
for catching up.
In case of inappropriate adjustment strategies (LAS),
France and Germany will suffer per capita income losses in
absolute terms. It is only because of the higher potential
for a technological catching-up that Italy and the United
Kingdom achieve a slight increase in income even in this
case.
The loss of output per capita, incurred in the period
1984-95, would amount to more than 50 per cent of the 1984
per capita GDP in the four sample countries in the LAS case
(Table 18). The difference between CAS, in which accumulated
output losses are lower, and LAS would be greatest for West
Germany (31 per cent rather than 53 per cent) and smallest
for the United Kingdom (48 per cent rather than 60 per
cent). In all countries, maladjustment seems to be subject
to a law of diminishing real costs: The fall from HAS to CAS
is much deeper than that from CAS to LAS.
2. A Model of the West German Economy; Comparative Statics
The projections on the basis of cross country analyses
assume that, under identical "circumstances", each country
would react identically to shocks (defined above as changes
in protection, in subsidies, in rules and regulations). The
real world, of course, is different, and so are the atti-
tudes and reactions of people. The implications for adjust-
ment can be measured only in specific country models. A
general equilibrium model for the German economy, con-- 53 -
Table 17: Dynamic Output Effects of Adjustment Strategies in Four
EC Countries up to 1995: U.S. Dollars per Capita
a
Adjustment strategy
High adjustment scenario income
in 1995
Central adjustment
scenario income in 1995
Low adjustment
scenario income in 1995





























I, 1960-1984. Paris 1986; own calculations.
structed at the Kiel Institute of World Economics , may
serve this purpose; there is, to our knowledge, no compara-
ble model available for the other three countries considered
here.
The different adjustment scenarios, excluding rules and
regulations, enter the model as follows:
The model is centred around an input/output matrix of 1978
with 60 sectors. It consists of more than 400 equations.
The results of the model are of the comparative static
kind, either short run (with low degrees of factor mobili-
ty, and unchanged capital stocks), or long-run (with high
degrees of factor mobility, including adjustment of the
capital stock to changes in both protection and profits).
See Gerken and Gross (1985) for details. Recent applica-
tions of this model show the effects of subsidy cuts in
Germany (Gerken, JUttemeier, Schatz, Schmidt, 1985) and
those of the subsidization of the German steel industry
(Gerken, Gross, Lachler, 1986) .- 54 -
Table 18: Dynamic Output Losses of Maladjustment in Four EC Countries
up to 1995: U.S. Dollars per Capita
a
Adjustment strategy
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Source: As for tables 16 and 17.- 55 -
- The central adjustment scenario (CAS) is equivalent to the
null-hypothesis: If protection does not change there will
be no change in any aggregate. This results from the fact
that the model deals with the rates of change in a linear
way.
- High adjustment (HAS) is defined as a decline of subsidies
from their 1982 level by one half. The explicit and impli-
cit rate of tariff protection (the latter has been calcul-
ated by comparing price differentials of domestic and
world markets ) is reduced by the same rate.
- In the low adjustment case (LAS) it is assumed that the
increase of subsidies (in real terms) between 1985 and
1995 will be the same as in the past ten years (+ 32.7 per
cent). The same assumption is made for foreign trade pro-
tection.
A main feature of the model is that the government's
budget is assumed to be balanced for each strategy, which
means that in the HAS case the decline in subsidies is ac-
companied by a similar decline in income taxes and other
direct taxes; in the LAS case taxation is raised by the
amount by which subsidies are increased.
Let us look first at the "high adjustment scenario" (Table
19) . A reduction of subsidies by 50 per cent would raise
gross domestic product by 2.8 per cent. A reduction of trade
protection by 50 per cent would lead to a slightly lower
increase of GDP. With regard to branches, the major dif-
ference refers to "leather, textiles, clothing products";
this is due to the fact that import protection plays a much
greater role than subsidies in this sector (see below).
See Witteler (1986) for the most recent calculations of
effective protection in Germany.Table 19 : High Adjustment Scenario for West Germany (comparative statics)
Sector
Iron and steel, foundries, etc.
Electrical engineering, precision
instruments, etc.




Linear reduction of subsidies, tariff rates
each. - At constant prices.




























































Source; Gerken, Jiittemeier, Schatz, Schmidt (1985); own calculations.- 57 -
The effects on employment and on the real capital stock of
a reduction of subsidies and import protection differ
considerably. The capital stock declines in the case of
subsidy reductions, and remains roughly constant in the case
of a reduction of foreign trade protection. The explanation
is that subsidies nowadays go primarily into capital-inten-
sive activities whereas foreign trade protection on average
seems to be rather indifferent regarding factor intensities.
For the same reason, a cut of subsidies has a greater posi-
tive impact on employment than on gross value added, while
the effect on both variables is the same when import pro-
tection goes down.
An interesting case in HAS is the sector "leather, tex-
tiles, clothing products". Subsidy reduction would improve
this industry's situation a lot: Value added, employment and
the capital stock would increase; on the other hand, li-
beralization of foreign trade would hurt this industry the
most. The explanation seems straightforward: Production of
leather, textiles, and clothing goods receives subsidies far
below average (Table A3) , whereas foreign trade protection
is much above average (Witteler, 1986) . The exchange-rate-
effect of foreign trade liberalization compensates this
industry's losses only at the margin, whereas the tax reduc-
tion commensurate to the subsidy cut does favour production.
An important discriminating factor between "leather,
textiles, clothing products" and, say, the iron and steel-
industry is that the former produce close to final demand.
Though iron and steel also receives high foreign trade pro-
tection the effects of liberalisation are positive. In this
case, the positive effects of trade liberalization on steel
demanding sectors (machinery, automobile production, metal
products) outweigh the immediate negative impact on steel
production. The exchange rate effect of liberalization (a
depreciation of the deutschmark) also helps.- 58 -
Turning to the "low adjustment scenario" (Table 20), it
happens to be symmetrical to the HAS case on account of the
linear properties of the model applied. The effects thus can
also be explained by the same main factors: (1) by the in-
dustry structure of foreign trade protection and subsidiza-
tion; (2) by the input/output structure; (3) by the factor
intensities of the industries protected and of the
industries discriminated against.
A comparison of these results with those of the cross
country analysis reveals some striking similarities, al-
though the German model provides estimates of the static
welfare effects of a reallocation of resources, whereas the
cross-country analysis is about the dynamic implications of
liberalization. For instance, the absolute figures one ar-
rives at when assuming that the static reallocation gains
in the HAS case occur each year, are in the order of US
$7,000 up to 1995. The cumulative losses of maladjustment
(LAS) would amount to US $5,000 (the figures for the dy-
namic gains and losses are about US $4,000 and US $3,000
respectively ). There would be, however, a greater differ-
ence between static and dynamic adjustment gains and losses
if the estimates derived from the German model had taken
into account the rules and regulations argument.
V. Conclusions
As structural change and the adjustment to this change
is an inevitable part of the process of economic growth, the
central question is what strategies are appropriate. The
most general answer would be that an adjustment strategy
should, firstly, help internalize external economies of
individual adjustment costs; this refers to a Pareto-like
optimum of social affairs. Secondly, since social peace can
be considered essential for economic growth, the adjustment
Calculated as the difference between HAS and CAS, and
between CAS and LAS, respectively, as shown in Table 17.Table 20: Low Adjustment Scenario for West Germany (comparative statics)
Sector
Iron and steel, foundries, etc.
Electrical engineering, precision
instruments, etc.
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Source: As for table 19 ; own calculations.- 60 -
strategy should assist the adversely affected factors of
production in just the right proportion to maintain that
social peace. The latter calculus is, of course, obscured by
the fact that moral hazard problems are involved, as can
readily be seen in the political experience of every day.
Most of what has been done in European countries in the
past certainly does not fit condition one (internalization)
but rather - due to the wide range of interpretation possi-
bilities - condition two (social peace). Adjustment stra-
tegies in manufacturing have had several kinds of biases: A
regional one against the developing countries, a policy one
in favour of protectionist measures, and a sectoral one in
favour of but a few industries.
The first two interact with each other: The anti-de-
veloping country bias is revealed by the fact that trade
protection is concentrated upon imports from low-wage coun-
tries (including Japan for that matter), which are regarded
by many as a source of serious market disruption. The system
of effective tariff protection retains, even after the
tariff cuts agreed in the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade
negotiations, relatively high rates for labour-intensive and
raw material-intensive manufactures. Moreover, selective
non-tariff protectionism has been proliferating, with "vol-
untary" export restraints on a wide range of consumer goods
and other products supplied by developing countries in the
forefront. The third renewal of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement
(in July 1986), providing further restrictions in trade with
textiles and clothing, is the most recent illustration of
this anti-developing country bias.
The sectoral bias of adjustment strategies in manufac-
turing is manifested by the fact that iron and steel produc-
tion, shipbuilding, textiles and clothing, aircraft and
aerospace as well as telecommunications are the branches
which receive most government assistance throughout Europe.- 61 -
The measures applied have been differing among these in-
dustries: iron and steel is a cartel-cum-subsidy declining
industry case; shipbuilding is an ailing industry assisted
by public subsidies, public procurement and nationalization;
textiles and clothing are branches enjoying foreign-trade-
protection; aircraft is an industry which governments
support because of the high-technology content and the
growth potential generally ascribed to it; and telecommuni-
cation is the sector in which state-owned PTTs have, and
exploit, the monopoly for providing switching and trans-
mission systems, for regulating the utilization of the net-
work and for servicing the terminal equipment (a partial
deregulation is under way in the United Kingdom since the
early eighties). This sectoral bias in adjustment policies
shows how governments have come to believe that they should
prop up (obvious) losers simultaneously with picking or even
creating winners.
All experience in Europe shows that defensive adjustment
policies lead into a deadlock. The protected industries
become more vulnerable to international competition, not
less; output growth opportunities are foregone rather than
being used; the process of transforming obsolete jobs into
productive jobs which are internationally competitive is
retarded, thereby giving rise to more unemployment; the
development and application of advanced technologies moves
too slowly, causing Europe's economies to operate below
their full potential. The reason is that, in a growing world
economy, comparative advantages are in a state of constant
flux. If governments interfere too much with the operation
of the market mechanism, domestic firms and labour obtain
wrong information about promising as well as bleak invest-
ment and employment paths. Even worse, an opinion is formed
whithin the society that non-adjustment to structural change
is a sensible option, i.e., that it is compatible in the
medium run with economic growth and high employment.- 62 -
In order to resume sustained economic growth and higher
employment in Europe, governments will have to resist more
effectively demands of interest groups for tailor-made as-
sistance, and also resist the temptation of regulating ac-
tivities where competition would be the first best solution.
What matters is a policy restructuring away from government-
made incentives towards market incentives in all fields of
activity - this not only in manufacturing, but also in agri-
culture, let alone services in which many government inter-
ventions distort the relative prices of inputs used in in-
dustrial production, and thus have an adverse impact on the
international competitiveness of firms.
Improved market incentives as the pillar of more pro-
mising adjustment strategies would require the European
governments
to keep or restore monetary stability, to arrest selec-
tive protectionism and subsidization of sunset indus-
tries, to strengthen domestic and international com-
petition, and to open national public procurement to
competitive tender also for foreign firms;
to reform the tax system in several aspects, namely by
generally lowering marginal income taxes and by granting
newly founded companies adequate depreciation allowances
together with reasonably long periods for carrying for-
ward initial losses;
to make factor markets more efficient: the labour mar-
ket, by introducing more contractual freedom and by
controlling abuses of monopoly (monopsony) power; the
capital market, by dismantling barriers to equity fi-
nancing and to the supply of risk capital in favour of
new or innovative firms;
to deregulate the economy, including a removal of usual-
ly restrictive market entry regulations for new (or
foreign) firms, and including the possibility of exit of
(public) firms, especially in the services sector (main-- 63 -
ly transportation, insurance services, telecommunica-
tions) , thereby lowering input costs also for manufac-
turing.
Some steps in this direction have already been taken;
others are under serious consideration, and whether or not
they will be made depends on the ability of the governments
to overcome the resistance by interest groups. The commit-
ment of the EC Member State governments (made at the The
Hague Summit in February 1986) to achieve a true common
internal market by the end of 1992, as called for in the
Cockfield Report of the EC Commission (1985), could also
become decisive in improving the adjustment process and
thereby restoring Europe's economic dynamism; there would be
more options for economic activities when the entry to
markets is no longer restricted (Giersch, 1986) . The ways in
which structural change then will take place in detail will
be determined in the process of trial-and-error under which
entrepreneurs, domestic and foreign, always have to operate.
In a world fraught with uncertainty about the future, it is
not possible to specify in advance accurately the branches
for which the prospects are best, especially not in coun-
tries, as the European ones considered here, which are close
to the frontier of knowledge available in the world economy.
Governments and bureaucracies, each for themselves or in co-
ordination, cannot solve this problem of uncertainty. They
have no superior wisdom about future patterns of supply and
demand, changes in the international division of labour, and
technological developments. Wishful thinking is no substi-
tute for such knowledge. This is another reason for streng-
thening market incentives in the context of adjustment poli-
cies.- 64 -
APPENDIX: On the Measurement of Dynamic Output Effects
1. The Model
The model underlying the computations for Tables 17 to
19 belongs to the group "of Domar-Kuznets-type models which
emphasize the role of fixed capital formation and of techno-
logical progress in economic growth (Heitger 1985, 1986).
Capital formation is measured as the share of investment in
gross domestic product. As to technical progress, it is
assumed that its rate depends on a country's capacity to
catch up with the leading country - here the United States.
The argument behind this assumption is that technical know-
ledge can be imported like any other good; the less advanced
a country is in technology, the more options it has to close
gaps through technology imports. In case the (autonomous)
production of technological knowledge is more costly than
the imitation of existing technologies, the latecomer is in
a more favourable position than the frontrunner. In the
model applied, the per capita income of a country relative
to the U.S. per capita income has been taken as a measure
for induced technology advance ("technological gap").
With the help of this model it is possible to test for
other sources of economic growth by adding additional vari-
ables to the • equation. Two different approaches have been
applied here. The first contains as the crucial additional
variable the average effective rate of foreign trade protec-
tion (ERP) of the manufacturing industry; the second is
concerned with government transfers (subsidies) as a per
cent of the gross domestic product (GOV TRANS).
These two separate runs were necessary for statistical
reasons: Data on average ERP are available for only four in-
dustrial countries; they do not exhibit variances large
enough to make regressing sensible. Therefore, developing- 65 -
countries have been included in the first estimate. Also
included is the adult literacy rate (AD LIT) as a measure
for a country's endowment with human capital.
The second estimate is intended to single out the ef-
fects of government transfers. It refers to 13 industrial
countries in the sixties and seventies. The other additional
variable is the standard deviation of the change in the
consumer price index (CPI STD) to account for the distorting
effects of monetary policies on the allocation of resources.
The estimated contribution of each of these variables to
real economic growth is set out in Table 21. For measuring
the impact of alternative adjustment scenarios, the ERP
coefficient has been taken from equation 1; the GOV TRANS and
the INV SH coefficients are from equation 2, which deals
specifically with industrial countries.
2. Forecasting Procedure
The maximum adjustment scenario (MAS) refers to a hypo-
thetical world with zero protection, zero transfers, and op-
timal rules and regulations; this is a world we do not live
in. It has been constructed to show that high adjustment
(HAS) - with a 50 per cent reduction of protection and with
transfers like in Japan - is also costly: Economic growth is
1.7 per cent below what it could be, if protection and sub-
sidies were totally abolished .
The reasoning behind the impact of rules and regula-
tions is somewhat different. Since we have no knowledge of
the investment share under optimal conditions, the corre-
sponding MAS have been marked by dots. HAS is defined as
ressembling the Japanese case as far as investment condi-
tions are concerned; it shows that it would be possible to
The figures are derived by inserting the basic data (men-
tioned in the footnotes of Table 16, page 51) into the
growth functions shown in Table 21.Table 21: Regression Equations for Economic Growth
Endogenous
Variable








-0.04 RGDP +0.18 INV SH + 0.02 AD LIT - 0.51 ERP
(-3.63) (4.79) (1.64) (-2.37)
-0.06 RGDP +0.13 INV SH - 0.38 CPI STD - 0.07 GOV TRANS







Equation 1 is an OLS cross-country regression; equation 2 is an OLS cross-country pool
regression for 13 countries, in which each variable enters twice (as average of the sixties
and average of the seventies), t-statistics in brackets. - RGDP: Relative per capita income;
INV SH: investment share in gross domestic product (per cent); AD LIT: adult literacy rate;
ERP: effective rate of protection; CPI STD: standard deviation of the change in consumer price
index; GOV TRANS: government transfers as per cent of GDP.
I
Source: Heitger (1985, 1986)- 67 -
achieve a 5 per cent growth in all countries, plus an addi-
tional growth in the individual countries depending on
their technology advance due to imports of know-how from the
United States .
CAS and LAS are defined and calculated accordingly:
Losses due to protection and transfers are expressed as the
growth differential to MAS. The figures on rules and regula-
tions are not differentials but absolute percentages derived
by inserting the investment shares mentioned in Table 16
2 into the growth function .
The figures shown in the Tables 17 and 18 are calcu-
lated on the basis of GDP per capita in 1984, using purchas-
ing power parities; the growth rates for 11 years (1984-95)
are from Table 17. Take France as an example for Table 17:
an annual rate of growth of per capita income of 3.8 per
cent in HAS implies a compound rate of 1.5072 for 11 years
(thus the output effect amounts to 12,643x1.5072=19,055). In
Table 18, the total losses are derived from the differences
of output effects between HAS and the other two cases, as
shown in Table 17. These losses are then disentangled
according to the three kinds of adjustment strategies by
using the growth differentials between HAS and CAS/LAS, as
reported in Table 16.
It would have been wiser, perhaps, to define Japan as the
non-plus-ultra-country with respect to rules and regula-
tions. Then MAS (instead of HAS) would show a 5 per cent
growth regarding rules and regulations. The consequence
would have been to define, say, each country's performance
in the sixties as representative of the HAS case; the
growth differentials between the newly defined MAS (5 per
cent) and the individual country performance would then be
the output loss of not having optimal rules. CAS and LAS
would be defined accordingly, thus also showing losses
(negative signs).
2
Since HAS and LAS are standardized cases, growth differ-
entials among the four countries are solely due to dif-
ferences in the technological catching-up potential.- 68 -
ANNEX TABLES AND FIGURES








Iron and steel products
Chemicals
Sawmills and timber processing














Manufactures of paper and paperboard
Printed matter
Plastic products




Food and beverages, tobacco






































































































































































































































































Source; Federal Statistical Office, Foreign Trade Statistics and Statistical Yearbook, current issues;
own calculations.- 69 -
Table A2 - Revealed Comparative Advantage
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Source: As for table Al- 70 -
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Source: Jiittemeier (1987) .- 71 -
Table A4 - The Distribution of Subsidy Prograinmes in West German








Iron and steel products
Chemicals
Sawmills and timber processing

























TDetails for sectors and industries m
Number of branches participating
in the same subsidy programme

















































































































































































Source: As for table A3.Table A5 - Output and Input Performance in West German Manufacturing
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Source: Deutsches Institut fur Wirtschaftsforschung (current issues); ovm calculations.- 73 -
Figure A6: Changes in the Real Revealed Coinparative
Advantage




























































*RCA as defined in tables 10 and A2, in prices of 1978.
DDefined as the ratio of industry-specific unit values of
exports to unit values of imports. For each branch the unit
values are weighted averages of subbranches; the 1978 shares
in trade by volume have been taken as weights.
"For abbreviations of industry and sources of figures A6-A8
see page 76'.- 74 -
Figure A7: Changes in the Real Revealed Comparative
Advantage



































































lRCA as defined in tables 10 and A2, in prices of 1978.
''Defined as the ratio of industry-specific unit values of
exports to unit values of imports. For each branch the unit
values are weighted averages of subbranches;the 1978 shares
in trade by volume have been taken as weights.
"For abbreviations of industry and sources of figures A6-A8
see page 76.- 75 -
Figure A8: Changes in the Real Revealed Comparative
Advantage
a and in the Terms of Trade ,
1965-73 and 1978-84
- West Germany —
1965/1973 RCA
8«oo *"


























































aRCA as defined in tables 10 and A2, in prices of 19 80.
bDefined as the ratio of industry-specific export prices
to import prices (1980=100).
cFor abbreviations of industry and sources of figures A6-A8
see page 76.- 76 -















































Musical instruments, toys, etc.
Non-ferrous metals
Office and data processing machines
Petroleum refinery
Plastic products
Pulp, paper, and board




Sawmills and timber processing








Graph A8 (West Germany)
Direction Generale des Douanes et
Droits Indirects, Statistique du Com-
merce Exterieur de la France, Annu-
aire Abrege. Paris, current issues;
own calculations.
Istituto Centrale di Statistica,
Annuario Statistico Italiano, Roma,
current issues; own calculations.
Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 7
(Aussenhandel), Reihe 7 (Aussenhandel
nach Landern und Warengruppen der
Industriestatistik, Spezialhandel),
current issues, and Fachserie 17
(Preise), Reihe 8 (Preise und Preis-
indices fur die Ein- und Ausfuhr) .
Wiesbaden, current issues; own calcu-
lations .- 77 -
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